Optimal Auction For Edge Computing Resource Management in Mobile
  Blockchain Networks: A Deep Learning Approach by Luong, Nguyen Cong et al.
Optimal Auction For Edge Computing Resource Management
in Mobile Blockchain Networks: A Deep Learning Approach
Nguyen Cong Luong, Zehui Xiong, Ping Wang, and Dusit Niyato
School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798
Abstract—Blockchain has recently been applied in many ap-
plications such as bitcoin, smart grid, and Internet of Things
(IoT) as a public ledger of transactions. However, the use
of blockchain in mobile environments is still limited because
the mining process consumes too much computing and energy
resources on mobile devices. Edge computing offered by the
Edge Computing Service Provider can be adopted as a viable
solution for offloading the mining tasks from the mobile devices,
i.e., miners, in the mobile blockchain environment. However, a
mechanism needs to be designed for edge resource allocation to
maximize the revenue for the Edge Computing Service Provider
and to ensure incentive compatibility and individual rationality
is still open. In this paper, we develop an optimal auction based
on deep learning for the edge resource allocation. Specifically,
we construct a multi-layer neural network architecture based
on an analytical solution of the optimal auction. The neural
networks first perform monotone transformations of the miners’
bids. Then, they calculate allocation and conditional payment
rules for the miners. We use valuations of the miners as the
data training to adjust parameters of the neural networks so
as to optimize the loss function which is the expected, negated
revenue of the Edge Computing Service Provider. We show the
experimental results to confirm the benefits of using the deep
learning for deriving the optimal auction for mobile blockchain
with high revenue.
Index Terms—Mobile blockchain network, edge computing,
auction, deep learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain has been adopted in many applications such
as Bitcoin [1], smart grid power systems [2], and finance
industry [3]. Recent reports predict that the annual rev-
enue for enterprise applications of blockchain will increase
from approximately $2.5 billion worldwide in 2016 to $19.9
billion by 2025, meaning a compound annual growth rate
of 26.2% (https://www.tractica.com/research/blockchain-for-
enterprise-applications/). Different from the centralized dig-
ital ledger approaches, blockchain does not rely on cen-
tralized authorities to store transaction data. Instead, data
blocks are recorded and shared by blockchain users over
the whole blockchain network. Thus, the blockchain achieves
high throughput and efficiency of transaction processing while
maintaining data security and integrity.
However, deploying blockchain applications in mobile net-
works faces some critical challenge. This is due to the mining
process, i.e., solving the Proof-of-Work (PoW) puzzle, which
requires high computing power and energy from mobile de-
vices. To address the challenge, the edge computing paradigm
is introduced into the mobile blockchain networks [4], [5]
which allows the mining task of mobile users, i.e., the miners,
to be offloaded to an Edge Computing Service Provider
(ECSP). However, an important issue of how to efficiently
allocate the limited edge computing resources to miners still
remains.
Auction becomes an appropriate solution which can guar-
antee that the edge computing resources are allocated to the
miners which value the resources most. In a traditional auction,
bidders or buyers, which are miners in the mobile blockchain
context, compete for the resource units by submitting their
prices, i.e., bids, to the ECSP as an auctioneer, i.e., the seller.
Given the received bids, the ECSP determines the winning
miners and the prices that they pay. However, traditional
auctions such as the first-price auction and the second-price
auction only guarantee either revenue gain for the ECSP or
Incentive Compatibility (IC). The problem of designing an
optimal auction in terms of maximizing the revenue for the
ECSP and ensuring Dominant-Strategy IC (DSIC) as well as
Individual Rationality (IR) is considerably challenging.
In recent years, the deep learning technique which is able
to automatically identify relevant features has gained consid-
erable attention. The deep learning, in principle, uses neural
networks to encode any mapping from inputs to outputs [6].
Especially, by using stochastic gradient descent, the deep
learning succeeds in finding globally optimal solutions. In
this regard, the authors in [12] proposed to use the deep
learning for the optimal auctions. The deep learning architec-
ture particularly fits for aforementioned setting and problem.
In particular, in edge computing resource auction, the inputs
to the neural networks are the miners’ bids and the outputs
encode the winner determination and payments of the miners.
In this paper, we thus use the deep learning architecture
which was proposed in [12] for the edge resource allocation
for mobile blockchain networks. Specifically, we leverage the
analytical solution from [7] to construct the neural network
architecture to provide precise fit to the optimal auction. The
neural networks first perform monotone transformations of
bidding valuations of the miners. Then, they calculate the
allocation rule, i.e., winning probabilities of the miners, and
the conditional payment rule to the miners. A neural network
training is finally implemented to adjust parameters of the
neural networks so as to optimize a loss function which is
the expected, negated revenue of the ECSP.
Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed scheme
can converge quickly to the solution at which the revenue
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of the ECSP is significantly higher than that obtained by
the traditional auction. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper that investigates the application of deep
learning-based auction for the edge resource allocation in
mobile blockchain networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II re-
views related work. Section III describes the system model and
problem formulation. Section IV presents the deep learning-
based optimal auction algorithm for the edge resource alloca-
tion. Section V shows the numerical performance evaluation
results. Section VI summarizes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There have recently been studies on the applications of
game theory and pricing models for blockchain networks. As
a pioneer work, the authors in [8] modeled the mining process
as a game among the miners. In the game, the strategies
of the miners are to determine branches of blockchain to
mine. It is then proved that if the miners behave as expected
by the Bitcoin designer, there exists a Nash equilibrium in
the game. The game approach is also found in [9], but the
strategies of the miners are to determine the size of block
to broadcast as their responses. Analytical solutions are used
to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium. However, the
model has only two miners. Different from [8] and [9], the
authors in [10] proposed the cooperative game for the mining
pool. Accordingly, the miners form a coalition to accumulate
computational power and have steady reward. However, the
proposed scheme only considers the internal mining, but not a
dynamic environment such as the mobile blockchain network.
The reason is from the fact that the mining process with high
computing power demand cannot be efficiently implemented
at the mobile devices. To address the issue, the authors in
[4] introduced an edge computing model into the mobile
blockchain network. In the model, the mining process of
miners, i.e., mobile users, is offloaded to an ECSP. The
allocation of the edge resources to the miners is implemented
using a pricing approach based on the combinatorial auction.
The proposed scheme maximizes the social welfare while
guaranteeing incentive compatibility or truthfulness. However,
the revenue of the ECSP is not considered which is the
most important factor to incentivize the ECSP to offer its
edge computing services. To optimize the revenue, the authors
in [12] proposed to use deep learning, an emerging tool
for finding globally optimal solutions, for optimal auctions.
However, the considered models are general auctions.
The aforementioned approaches motivate us to investigate
an optimal mechanism for the edge resource allocation in the
mobile blockchain network. Specifically, we employ the deep
learning architecture in [12] to design the optimal mechanism
which guarantees the revenue maximization for the ECSP
while ensuring the DSIC and IR.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section introduces the mining process of miners and
then presents the system model of the mobile blockhain
network as well as the edge resource allocation problem.
A. Blockchain Mining Process
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Fig. 1: System model of edge computing in mobile blockchain
network. ECSP stands for Edge Computing Service Provider.
To create a chain of blocks, a mining process is implemented
to confirm and secure transactions to be stored in a block. The
mining process actually solves the proof-of-work (PoW). The
PoW is a complex mathematical problem [11] in which solving
the problem depends on the set of transactions to be included
in the block. The mathematical problem is in a form of the
hash function to combine the information about the previous
block and the set of current transactions. After the problem is
solved, the solution has to be propagated to reach consensus,
i.e., a certain number of miners agreeing and accepting the
solution. Once all these steps are done successfully, the set
of transactions proposed by the miner forms a block that is
appended to the current blockchain. The first miner which
successfully obtains the solution of the PoW and reaches the
consensus receives a mining reward. In general, solving the
PoW requires high computing power, time, and energy, and
thus it cannot be efficiently executed at the mobile devices. As
such, we introduce the edge computing model to the mobile
blockchain network for offloading the mining process from the
mobile devices.
B. Edge Computing for Blockchain Mining
The edge computing model is shown in Fig. 1 which
consists of one ECSP and mobile users, i.e., the miners. The
ECSP owns edge computing resources which are distributed
across over the network to provide the mobile users computing
resource services. We consider a small area of the network
including N mobile users and one edge computing resource
unit of the ECSP. Because the edge computing resource unit
is only assigned to a single mobile user, the mobile users
compete on buying the unit. Note that each mobile user may
already have an initial computing capacity denoted by ci. If
the miner obtains the edge computing resource, it will be
combined with the initial computing capacity to speed up the
mining process. The size of a block is denoted by ti, which is
the amount of transactions to be included in the block chosen
by the miner. In general, when the size of the block ti is
larger, the miner has more incentive to buy the edge computing
resource unit to complete mining the block. This means that
the miner is willing to pay a high price for the edge computing
resource unit. On the contrary, when the initial computing
capacity is larger, the miner has the less incentive. In this
case, the miner is willing to pay a low price. Let vi denote
the valuation, i.e., the private value, of miner i of the edge
computing resource unit. Then, vi of miner i can be expressed
as vi = tici .
To obtain the largest revenue gain as well as to guarantee
that the edge computing resource unit is allocated to the miner
which values the resource unit most, the resource allocation
can be modeled as a single-item auction. In the auction, the
miners are bidders, i.e., the buyers, and the ECSP is the
auctioneer, i.e., the seller. Miner i submits price bi as a bid that
the miner is willing to pay the ECSP. Based on the bid profile
b = (b1, . . . , bN ) from all the miners, the ECSP determines
the winning miner for the edge computing unit and the
corresponding price that the winner needs to pay. The ECSP
can employ traditional single-item auctions such as the first-
price auction and Second-Price Auction (SPA) to determine
the price for the winning miner. However, none of them is an
optimal auction. Specifically, the first-price auction guarantees
the revenue gain for the ECSP, but cannot ensure the IC. That
is, the miners have incentive to submit untruthfully their bids
so as to improve their utility ui = vi − bi, i = 1, . . . , N . The
SPA can hold the IC, but the revenue improvement for the
ECSP is not guaranteed.
Therefore, the ECSP needs to solve the problem of optimal
single-item auction. More specifically, the ECSP needs to
determine the winner and the corresponding payment so as
to maximize the ECSP’s revenue, i.e., the payment received
from the winner, while guaranteeing the DSIC and IR. A
mechanism is DSIC if the utility of each miner is maximized
by submitting truthfully its bid regardless of the other miners’
actions. The IR is to guarantee that the miners have non-
negative utility for participating in the auction. The design
of such an exactly optimal auction is still open. Therefore, we
design the optimal single-item auction using deep learning for
the resource allocation which is presented in the next section.
IV. OPTIMAL AUCTION USING DEEP LEARNING
In this section, we introduce a neural network architecture
for the single-item auction as presented in Section III. The
neural network architecture is found in [12] which implements
allocation and payment rules for the ECSP and guarantees
that any auction mechanism learned by the network will be
the optimal auction. Again, the optimal auction is in terms of
maximizing revenue of the ECSP and ensuring the DSIC and
IR. The learned mechanism is expected to provide precise fit to
the optimal auction design, and thus we leverage the monotone
transform functions, denoted as φi, i = 1, . . . , N , from [7]
to determine the allocation and payment rules of the neural
network architecture. As presented in [7], input bids bi, i =
1, . . . , N , of miners are first transformed to bi = φi(bi), i =
1, . . . , N . Then, the SPA with zero reserve price (SPA-0) is
used on the transformed bids bi to determine the allocation and
conditional payment rules for the miners. Here, the reserve
price refers to the lowest price which is acceptable by the
ECSP for the resource unit. Let p0i (b) and g
0
i (b) denote the
SPA-0 allocation rule and the SPA-0 payment rule for miner
i, respectively. Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ( [7]).For any set of strictly monotonically
increasing functions φ1, . . . , φN : R≥0 7→ R≥0, an auction
which is defined by allocation rule gi = g0i ◦φi and conditional
payment rule pi = φ−1i ◦ p0i is DSIC and IR.
Theorem 1 means that if we construct a mechanism with
allocation and conditional payment rules, i.e., gi and pi, then
the mechanism satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions
for DSIC and IR for any choice of strictly monotone transform
functions [12]. This is the reason that we use Theorem 1 to
constrain our neural network architecture to learn the auction.
As such, the auction learned by the neural network will be
DSIC and IR. However, instead of specifying the precise
functional form of the transform functions, the neural network
learns the appropriate transform functions to minimize a loss
function, i.e., the expected, negated revenue of the ECSP,
which is equivalent to maximizing the expected revenue of the
ECSP. The neural network architecture is shown in Fig. 3(a)
with multiple layers to perform (i) the monotone transform
functions φi, (ii) the allocation rule gi, and (iii) the conditional
payment rule pi. The algorithm for implementing these steps
are given in Algorithm 1, and the further details are described
in the following.
Algorithm 1 DL-based Auction Algorithm
Input: N,S, J,K, κ, fT (t), fC(c),vs = (vs1, . . . , vsN ), v
s
N+1;
Output: Assignment probabilities (g1, . . . , gN ) and condi-
tional payments (p1, . . . , pN );
1: Initialize: w = [wikj ] ∈ RN×JK>0 , β = [βikj ] ∈ RN×JK ;
2:
3: repeat
4: Compute vsi = φi(v
s
i ) = min
1≤k≤K
max
1≤j≤J
(wikjv
s
i + β
i
kj);
5: Compute gi = softmaxi(vs1, . . . , v
s
N , v
s
N+1;κ) =
eκvi∑N+1
j=1 e
κvj
;
6: Compute p0i = ReLU{max
j 6=i
vsj};
7: Compute pi = φ−1i (p
0
i ) = max
1≤k≤K
min
1≤j≤J
(wikj)
−1(p0i −
βikj);
8: Compute the loss function Rˆ(w,β) =
−∑Ni=1 g(w,β)i (vs)p(w,β)i (vs);
9: Update (w,β) using the SGD solver.
10: until The loss function Rˆ(w,β) minimizes
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Fig. 2: Illustration of (a) neural network architecture and (b)
monotone transformation φi, where hkj(bi) = wikjbi + β
i
kj .
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Fig. 3: Illustration of (a) allocation rule g and (b) SPA-0
payment rule p0.
A. Monotone Transform Functions
Transform function φi is used to map input bid bi of miner
i to its transformed bid bi. We model each φi as a two-layer
feed forward network with min and max operators over linear
functions as shown in Fig. 3(b). Here, we use K groups of J
linear functions hkj(bi) = wikjbi + β
i
kj , where k = 1, . . . ,K,
j = 1, . . . , J , wikj ∈ R>0 and βikj are the weights and bias,
respectively. Then, the transform function φi is defined as
follows:
φi(bi) = min
k=1,...,K
max
j=1,...,J
(wikjbi + β
i
kj). (1)
In fact, the inverse transform φ−1i can be directly deduced
from the parameters for the forward transform as follows:
φ−1i (y) = max
k=1,...,K
min
j=1,...,J
(wikj)
−1(y − βikj). (2)
Such a neural network is similar to a general autoencoder
neural network which consists of two parts [12], i.e., the en-
coder and the decoder. The encoder performs transformations
of the input bids to a different representation through using
(1) and the decoder inverts the transform through using (2).
B. Allocation Rule
The allocation rule is based on the SPA-0 allocation.
Specifically, it assigns the computing resource unit of the
ECSP to the miner with the highest transformed bid if this
transformed bid is greater than zero, and leaves the computing
resource unit unassigned otherwise. In our work, as illustrated
in Fig. 3(a), the allocation rule maps the transformed bids
b = (b1, . . . , bN ), i.e., the input, to a vector of assignment
probabilities g = (g1, . . . , gN ), i.e., the output. Since there
is a competition among the miners, the allocation rule can
be approximated by using a softmax function on the trans-
formed bids b = (b1, . . . , bN ) and an additional dummy input
bN+1 = 0 as follows:
gi(b) = softmaxi(b1, . . . , bN+1;κ) =
eκbi∑N+1
j=1 e
κbj
,∀i ∈ N,
(3)
where κ > 0 is the parameter which determines the quality of
the approximation [12]. The higher value of κ increases the
accuracy of the approximation. However, the allocation func-
tion may be discontinuous and less smooth which becomes
harder to optimize.
C. Conditional Payment Rule
The conditional payment rule sets price pi to miner i given
that the miner is the winner. The conditional payment is
implemented by two steps. The first step calculates SPA-0
payment p0i to the miners as shown in Fig. 3(b), and the second
step determines conditional payment pi by using Theorem 1.
Specifically, the SPA-0 payment p0i to miner i is the
maximum of the transformed bids from the other miners and
zero. Thus it can be determined using a ReLU activation unit
as follows:
p0i (b) = ReLU(max
j 6=i
bj),∀i ∈ N, (4)
where ReLU(z) = max(z, 0) is an activation function which
ensures that the SPA-0 payment is non-negative. The condi-
tional payment to miner i is then calculated as pi = φ−1i ◦
p0i (b) = φ
−1
i (p
0
i (b)), where φ
−1
i (y) is determined according
to (2).
In summary, the allocation rule can be seen as a feed-
forward network including (i) a layer of linear functions, (ii)
a layer of max-min operations, and (iii) a layer of softmax
activation functions. The conditional payment rule which has
more layers because of using additional inverse transforms
can be seen as a network consisting of (i) a layer of linear
functions, (ii) a layer of max-min operations, (iii) a layer of
ReLU activation functions, (iv) a layer of linear functions, and
(v) a layer of min-max operations.
D. Neural Network Training
The objective of the training is to optimize weights and
bias of a neural network so as to minimize a loss function
that is defined on the inputs and outputs of the network.
In our work, the weights and the bias are wikj and β
i
kj ,
where i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , J , and k = 1, . . . ,K,
the loss function is defined as the expected, negated revenue
function Rˆ of the ECSP, and the input, i.e., the training data
or training set, consists of bidder valuation profiles of the
miners. In particular, the bidder valuation profiles of the miners
are sampled independently and identically distributed from a
known distribution function. Generating the bidder valuation
profiles is described as follows.
Let vs = (vs1, . . . , v
s
N ) denote bidder valuation profile s of
the miners, where s = 1, . . . , S, S is the size of the training
data, and vsi is the valuation, i.e., the private value, of miner i
on the resource computing unit which is drawn from a distri-
bution fV (v). As mentioned in Section III, vsi of miner i can
be expressed through its block size ti and its initial computing
capacity ci, i.e., vsi = ti/ci. Thus, the distribution fV (v) can
be determined based on the distribution of ti, denoted as fT (t),
and that of ci, denoted by fC(c). The distributions fT (t) and
fC(c) are available, e.g., based on the previous observations.
Assume that variables t and c are independent from each other
and follow uniform distributions [13], i.e., t ∼ U [tmin; tmax]
and c ∼ U [cmin; cmax], cmin > 0. Then, fV (v) is determined
as follows.
Let z = c, v = t/c, and we have t = vz and c = z. Given
the setting, the Jacobian determinant JD among t, c, v and z
is given by
JD =
∣∣∣∣ ∂t∂v ∂t∂z∂c
∂v
∂c
∂z
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣z v0 1
∣∣∣∣ = z. (5)
The Probability Density Function (PDF) for the joint distri-
bution (v, z) is given by
fV,Z(v, z) =fT (v, z)fC(z)|JD|
=
1
(tmax − tmin)(cmax − cmin) |z|. (6)
The distribution of v, i.e., fV (v), is determined by
fV (v) =
∫ +∞
−∞
fV,Z(v, z)dz
=
∫ cmax
cmin
1
(tmax − tmin)(cmax − cmin) |z|dz (7)
=
cmin + cmax
2(tmax − tmin) ,
where v is within [tmin/cmax; tmax/cmin].
Let g(w,β)i (v
s) and p(w,β)i (v
s) denote the assignment prob-
ability and conditional payment of miner i, respectively. w
and β are the matrices containing weights wikj and bias β
i
kj ,
i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , J , and k = 1, . . . ,K, respectively.
The objective is to find parameters (w∗,β∗) to minimize the
expected, negated revenue function of the ECSP as the loss
function:
Rˆ(w,β) = −
N∑
i=1
g
(w,β)
i (v
s)p
(w,β)
i (v
s). (8)
We optimize the loss function Rˆ(w,β) in (8) over parame-
ters (w,β) using a Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) solver.
The implementation details are given in Section V.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present experimental results to demon-
strate that deep learning can be used to improve the revenue for
the ECSP in the mobile blockchain network. For comparison,
the proposed scheme is named Deep Learning (DL)-based
auction. The SPA [14] is used as a baseline scheme. The
DL-based auction is implemented by using the TensorFlow
deep learning library. The simulation parameters are shown in
Table I. Note that the L2 regularization is used in the training
step to ensure that the weight parameters are bounded. Also,
the training set has 1000 valuation profiles vs = (vs1, . . . , v
s
N ),
and samples ti and ci are chosen from distributions fT (t) and
fC(c), respectively.
TABLE I: Simulation parameters
Parameters Values
Number of miners (N ) 10, 15, and 20
Learning rate 0.0001
Regularization parameter (L2) 0.01
Training set size (S) 1000 valuation profiles
Number of groups (K) 5
Number of linear functions (J) 10
Number of iterations 4000
Approximate quality κ 1 and 2
Distribution of size of block fT (t) ∼ U [0; 1]
Distribution of initial capacity fC(c) ∼ U [0.2; 0.5], U [0.4; 0.7]
To evaluate the performance of the DL-based auction, we
consider different scenarios by varying the number of miners
N , the distribution of initial capacity ci of the miners, and the
parameter of approximate quality κ. Here, we consider the
mobile blockchain network with the number of miners of 10,
15, and 20. The simulation results for the revenue versus the
number of iterations are provided in Figs. 4, 5, 6, and 7, and
those of winning probability of the miners versus their initial
capacity are shown in Fig. 8. Note that the baseline scheme
is represented by the black and cyan lines.
It can be seen from Figs. 4, 5, and 6 that the DL-based
auction converges quickly to the solution which is on a par
with the other schemes. Also, for a given number of miners
and distribution of initial capacity, the revenue obtained by the
DL-based auction is significantly higher than that obtained by
the SPA. For example, for N = 15 and ci ∼ U [0.2; 0.5], the
revenue obtained by the SPA is 2.8966 while that obtained
by the DL-based auction is 3.1460 with κ = 1. The revenue
improvement is clearly achieved in the other scenarios, i.e.,
Figs. 5 and 6, which confirms the benefit and effectiveness of
the proposed scheme.
We next evaluate the impacts of the number of miners on
the revenue of the ECSP. From Fig. 7, we find that given
the distribution ci ∼ U [0.2; 0.5] and κ = 1, the revenue
of the ECSP increases with the increase of the number of
miners. This is due to the fact that having more miners will
intensify the competition, which potentially motivates them to
pay higher service prices. As a result, the revenue of the ECSP
increases.
Then, we examine the impact of distribution ranges of initial
capacity ci of miners on the revenue of the ECSP. Consider
the case of 10 miners, it is observed from Fig. 5 that as ci
is within the small range, i.e., ci ∼ U [0.2; 0.5], the expected
revenue of the ECSP increases compared with the large range,
i.e., ci ∼ U [0.4; 0.7]. The reason is that the submitted prices,
i.e., the bids, of miners are inversely proportional to the initial
capacity. Therefore, given the fixed distribution of the sizes
of blocks, the submitted prices are higher with the low initial
capacity which in turn improves the expected revenue of the
ECSP.
Further, we consider the impact of the parameter κ on the
expected revenue of the ECSP. As mentioned in Section IV,
κ is introduced to the softmax function for the winner deter-
mination. In general, the large value of κ results in a more
correct decision made by the winner. However, it makes the
optimization harder and more complex to solve [12]. This may
result in reducing the expected revenue of the ECSP. Indeed, as
shown in Fig. 4, for ci ∼ U [0.2; 0.5] and N = 10, the expected
revenues of the ECSP obtained from the DL-based auction are
2.7741 and 2.6811 for κ = 1 and κ = 2, respectively.
At last, it is important to consider the impact of initial
capacity ci of the miners on its winning probability. Without
loss of generality, we consider winning probability of miner
1 as its initial capacity c1 is varied from 0.05 to 0.5 and
the initial capacity of other miners is ci ∼ U [0.2; 0.5],
i = 2, . . . , N . With 10 miners, i.e., N = 10, as shown
in Fig. 8, the winning probability of miner 1 decreases as
its initial capacity c1 increases. This is due to the fact that
the miner 1’s submitted price decreases. As seen, when the
number of miners increases, e.g., N = 15 and N = 20, the
winning probability of miner 1 further decreases because of
more competitive miners.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed an optimal auction based
on deep learning for the edge resource allocation in mobile
No. of iterations
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
R
ev
en
ue
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
DL-based auction (5 =1,ci~U[0.2;0.5])
DL-based auction (5 =2, ci~U[0.2;0.5])
SPA (ci~U[0.2;0.5])
DL-based auction (5 =1, ci~U[0.4;0.7])
DL-based auction (5 =2, ci~U[0.4;0.7])
SPA (ci~U[0.4;0.7])
Fig. 5: Test revenue for 15 miners.
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Fig. 7: Test revenue for ci ∼ U [0.2; 0.5] and κ = 1.
blockchain networks. Specifically, we have constructed a neu-
ral network architecture based on an analytical solution. We
have designed the data training for the neural networks by
using the valuations of the miners. Based on the training data,
we have trained the neural networks by adjusting parameters
so as to optimize the expected, negated revenue of the ECSP.
As illustrated in the simulation results, the proposed scheme
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Fig. 8: Winning probability of miner 1 versus initial capacity.
can quickly converge to a solution at which the revenue of
the ECSP is significantly higher than that obtained by the
baseline scheme. For the future work, a general scenario with
multiple edge computing resource units should be considered.
Also, how to construct the neural network architecture for an
optimal auction without using the characterization results of
the analytical solution needs to be investigated.
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